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URBAN HOUSING FINANCE AND THE
REDLINING CONTROVERSY
I. INTRODUCrION
"R EDtINING" tends to trigger a varied respons from community action
11 groups and financial institutions. The term is used by public in-
terest and community action groups as a code word for alleged policies
and practices of financial institutions that earmark certain urban neigh-
borhoods as areas where conventional home mortgage loans are not
approved. The charge is made that institutional lenders have literally or
figuratively red-penciled neighborhoods into a downward spiral of
blight, abandonment, and demolition.2  Financial institutions are
genuinely concerned about the use of this vivid term to spearhead the
attack on what they view as responsible lending policies and practices
based on realistic appraisals of housing and credit risks in urban areas.
3
The term is receiving rather wide usage as current legislative and legal
developments bring the controversy before the public eye.
4
The redlining controversy must be considered from the perspective of
what is happening to housing stock in older cities. Once viable urban
neighborhoods have become wastelands, scarred by traces of demolished
I While the essence of redlining is geographical discrimination in home loans, most
definitions of redlining fall into two general categories. Racial redlining refers to policies
or practices by which lending institutions discriminate in the granting of, or in the setting of
terms for home loans based upon the perceived racial characteristics (determined by
present or projected occupants) of the neighborhood in which the borrower wishes to live.
Economic redlining refers to policies and practices of lenders that consider certain geo-
graphical areas as zones of excessive economic risk, regardless of the characteristics of
the individual borrower or the property involved.
I Community action groups that emphasize racial redlining from the black perspective
find support for their view in such research as the NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, THE NA-
TIONAL SURVEY ON HOUSING ABANDONMENT (1971) or R. DEVINE, W. RENNIE, & N. SIMS,
WHERE THE LENDER LOOKS FIRST: A CASE STUDY OF MORTGAGE DISINVESTMENT IN BRONX
COUNTY, 1960-1970 (1973). The white ethnic perspective on racial redlining is articulated
in ADUBATO & K~icKus, WHY A NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION STRATEGY? (1974) and
Newsletter of National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, Community Action on Redlining,
June 1974, at 10. The major analysis of economic redlining and attendant community
action strategies has been developed by the National Training and Information Center in
Chicago and distributed to their network, the National People's Action on Housing, through
the newsletter Disclosure. See also Organizing to Save the Cities - Savings and Loans
Challenged on Redlining Issue, JUST ECONOMICS, Sept. 1974, at 6.
3 Hearings on S. 1281 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, at 807 (1975) [hereinafter cited as S. 1281 Hearings]
(testimony of William A. Beasman, Jr. on behalf of National Association of Mutual Savings
Banks); Critics Say Lenders Hasten Urban Decay By Denying Mortgages . . .Bankers
Worry About Risk, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 5, 1974, at 1, col. 1; S. 1281 Hearings at 820
(testimony of Grover Hansen on behalf of National Savings and Loan League); Marshall,
Mortgage Red-lining: The Urban Disinvestment Dilemma, SAVINGS AND LOAN NEWS,
June 1974, at 8.
I The mounting pressure through 1975 from community action groups around the
country plus the congressional consideration of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
1975 brought the redlining controversy to the public's attention and evoked a series of
responses from the lending industry. Drive to Curb "Redlining" in Run-down Neighbor-
hoods, U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REPORT, June 9, 1975, at 76; Farrell, Redlining, Whether Cause
or Effect, Is No Help, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1975, § E, at 2. See also Daniel, Redlining
Reaches Congress, JOURNAL OF HOUSING, Sept. 1975, at 441.
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housing and dotted with vacant buildings. Blight and abandonment are
spreading from the inner city ghettoes of black and Hispanic poor to
transitional, mixed areas, white ethnic working class neighborhoods,
and even inner-ring suburbs.5  The phenomenon is not limited to a
natural process of discarding used-up, unneeded shelter; safe, sound,
adequate, and even attractive housing is falling into disrepair and being
abandoned at a time when the housing shortage for low and middle in-
come people is reaching an acute stage. Though urban blight involves
a complex of social and economic processes, the redlining controversy
focuses attention on one possible strategy to short-circuit this depressing
scenario of neighborhood decline - adequate money for home improve-
ment loans and first mortgages should be made readily available to
conscientious owners and purchasers. If redlining is indeed occurring, it
results in the inability of current homeowners or prospective home-
buyers to get loans on reasonable terms for a house in the redlined
neighborhood, despite their present or future financial status or the
soundness of the building."
There is nearly universal agreement that essential to the preserva-
tion of America's existing housing stock is the availability of home loans.
The consensus collapses, however, when attempting to allocate the
responsibilities and risks. Public interest and community action groups
place the responsibility on financial institutions arguing that because they
have taken money out of communities they are now bound to reinvest in
local home loans rather than "disinvest"7 by financing projects outside
the urban neighborhoods. Unhappy with the track record of the Federal
Housing Authority (FHA), such groups have looked to the government,
not for direct loan assistance, but for more effective regulation of finan-
cial institutions.8  Banks and savings and loan associations have re-
sisted the application of outside definitions of "reasonable risk" in
5 F. CASE, INNER-CrrY HOUSNc AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE (1972); L. DOWNIE, MORT-
CAGING AMERICA, FROM SLUMS TO SUBURBS (1975); M. STEGMAN, HOUSING INVESTMENT IN
THE INNER CITY: THE DYNAMICS OF DECLINE (1972); Taggart, Redlining: How the Bankers
Starve the Cities to Feed the Suburbs, PLANNING, Dec. 1974, at 14.
Taggart, supra note 5.
"Disinvestment" refers to four alleged practices of financial institutions:
(1) Refusal to make mortgage and home improvement loans to credit-worthy
people in those city neighborhoods and older suburbs which are not characterized
by unusual or excessive risks. (2) Exporting of savings generated from city neigh-
borhoods and older suburbs into other communities where they are invested in resi-
dential construction and mortgage loans without first considering the lending needs
of older communities. (3) Relocation of associations' home offices out of the older
communities and into other areas, usually into newly developing suburbs or "down-
town" business centers. (4) Withdrawal of opportunities for residents in older
communities to save at neighborhood-based savings and loan associations.
Administrative Meeting on Racial Discrimination in Lending Before the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Hartford, Conn., May 21, 1974 (testimony of Calvin
Bradford) (emphasis in original).
8 In many cities, especially in the Midwest, the FHA has been perceived as a neighbor-
hood destroyer, and community action groups have organized to obtain "FHA paybacks"
- damages to cheated families. See B. BOYER, CrrIEs DESTROYED FOR CASH: THE FHA
SCANDAL AT HUD (1973); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
REPORT No. 187 ON HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1975, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12
(1975); Stewart, Hard Panic Peddlers, FHA Loans Destroy Neighborhood, Chicago Press,
May 15, 1974, at 1.
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loanmaking and have depended on the government to cover high-risk
loan prospects.9 Federal agencies have preferred voluntary partner-
ships of property owners, lenders, and local governments and the use of
community development block grants to local governments to insure
home loans by local financial institutions. 10
This note will focus upon three basic issues raised by the redlining
controversy: first, whether or not redlining is in fact occurring; second,
the role of government through legislation and regulatory agencies;
third, emerging areas of litigation.
II. MixED REACTIONS TO THE EVIDENCE ON REDUNING
A. Indicators of Redlining
In 1970, the problem of housing abandonment crystalized and de-
veloped into a significant national issue." A variety of causes, in-
cluding tight money for rehabilitation loans, were isolated.12 By 1972,
governmental agency surveys had documented indications of wide-
spread redlining. 13  University research centers have also provided
sophisticated data indicating that redlining does exist. 14
' "The proper approach is ... to spread lending risks through Government mortgage
insurance, rather than concentrate these risks on the particular lenders and depositors
who happen to be located in deteriorating neighborhoods." S. 1281 Hearings at 808
(testimony of William A. Beasman, Jr.).
10 See letter from Robert A. Elliot (for Carla A. Hills, Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development) to William Proxmire (Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs), May 22, 1975, in S. 1281 Hearings at 17-19; letter from Arthur F. Burns (Chair-
man, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System) to William Proxmire, May 16, 1975,
id. at 20-21.
11 All the major news magazines "discovered" housing abandonment in early 1970. See
The Wildfire of Abandonment, BusuriEss WEEK, Apr. 4, 1970, at 57; Hollow Shells, NEws-
WEEK, Jan. 12, 1970, at 36; When Landlords Walk Away, TIME, Mar. 16, 1970, at 88; In
the Inner Cities: Acres of Abandoned Buildings, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT, Jan. 26,
1970, at 54.
12 Edson, Housing Abandonment - The Problem and a Proposed Solution, 7 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 382 (1972); Nachbaur, Empty Houses: Abandoned Residential
Buildings in the Inner City, 17 How. L.J. 3, 23-25 (1971); Note, Building Abandonment in
New York City, 16 N.Y.L.F. 798, 818 (1970).
13 For an analysis of government studies in 1972 that indicated the occurrence of red-
lining, see Doehrman, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and Sherman Act Violations Raised
by Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REv. 1045 n.3 (1975).
14 Northwestern University's Center for Urban Affairs established the Urban-Suburban
Investment Study Group.
Dr. George Sternlieb of the Center for Urban Policy Research at Rutgers University has
also conducted extensive research on housing abandonment. See, e.g., G. STERNLIEB, THE
URBAN HOUSING DsLi sA (1971), in S. 1281 Hearings at 547; G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL,
RESIDENTIAL ABANDONMENT (1973). He has concluded that "there is considerable evi-
dence of 'redlining.'" Sternlieb, The Urban Financing Dilemma (a staff research report
prepared for the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs), in S. 1281 Hear-
ings at 551. Sternlieb noted, however, that studies of disinvestment attempted by re-
searchers outside the financial institutions are hampered by inadequate access to essential
data with the result that "findings are often piecemeal." Id. at 570.
The prestigious MIT - Harvard Joint Center surveyed all relevant studies and reports
available in late 1974 and concluded:
Red-lining - the unavailability of mortgages on the basis of area - although no
longer "formally" practiced, nevertheless is found to be effectively present. A
process of disinvestment by local thrift institutions is found to be occurring in
many inner-city neighborhoods ...
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Illinois has been in the forefront of states that have scrutinized
home loan decisionmaking. Governor Dan Walker's Commission on
Mortgage Practices in cooperation with the Illinois Legislative Investi-
gating Commission conducted extensive hearings and engaged in tech-
nical research on home loan practices that resulted in the following red-
lining indicators: scores of serious redlining complaints by apparently
creditworthy loan applicants, the testimony of banking and federal
supervisory officials, technical analysis of available mortgage data by the
University of Chicago, and subpoenaed records of financial institutions.1 5
The conclusion that redlining existed was tempered by the failure of
some Illinois financial institutions to provide the necessary informa-
tion. 16
California officials have been less hesitant to conclude that red-
lining is a widespread practice in their state. The California Business
and Transportation Agency conducted hearings in the summer of 1975,
in Los Angeles and San Francisco, and directed the Department of Sav-
ings and Loans to engage in research on home mortgage practices. The
agency concluded that the research clearly evidenced mortgage loan
deficiencies in many areas.' Neighborhoods were being redlined by
financial institutions because of the presence or the proximity of black
or Chicano population concentrations. These indications of redlining in
California' are significant in understanding the national scope of
neighborhood disinvestment; in contrast to the generally declining urban
population centers in the Northeast and Midwest, California's urban
areas are population magnets.
Local city governments have researched the phenomenon of redlining
in conjunction with local efforts to stem housing abandonment. A
Baltimore study, conducted by that city's Department of Housing and
Community Development in 1972, found extensive redlining in inte-
grated or racially changing neighborhoods where FHA mortgages were
beginning to fill the vacuum in conventional home loans. 19
Community action groups have conducted and sponsored study proj-
ects on redlining that can generally be characterized as "action research"
with a patently adversary stance. Rather than dispassionate, objective
research, these groups usually gather evidence against financial insti-
tutions to support their organizing projects. Because the groups' adver-
sary posture opens their findings to counterattack by the lending insti-
MIT-HavARD JOINT CENTER, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NEIGHBORHOOD DECLINE: A
REVIEW OF THE LrrERAruaE 4 (1974), in S. 1281 Hearings at 618.
15 GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON MORTGAGE PRACTICES, HOME OWNERSHIP IN ILLINOIS:
THE ELUSIVE DREAM (1974). For the complete text of the Commission's report see S. 1281
Hearings at 38.
16 Id. at 12.
17 Memorandum from Donald E. Burns (Secretary of State of California Business and
Transportation Agency) to all state-chartered savings and loan associations, Aug. 26, 1975,
at 1.
Is See THE CENTER FOR NEW CORPORATE PRIoRrIEs, WHERE THE MONEY IS: MORTGAGE
LENDING, Los ANGELES CouNTY (1975).
19 CITY OF BALTIMORE DEP'T OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, HOME OWN-
ERSHIP AND THE BALTIMORE MORTGAGE MARKET (1972), in S. 1281 Hearings at 1477.
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tutions,20 the research tends to be honest and accurate, though often
oversimplified. 21  Groups in Chicago, Milwaukee, Providence, Balti-
more, Cleveland, Oakland, Indianapolis, and Cincinnati have been in
the forefront of a national movement toward documenting redlining's
existence in local communities. Community organizations with skilled
organizers in touch with one of the anti-redlining national networks
22
have been able to develop local research projects that point to redlining
and disinvestment in specific communities.
23
The validity of the conclusions of these local research projects is
strongly criticized by the federal regulatory agencies2 4 and by financial
institutions. 25  Outside researchers counter by charging that the "in-
siders," the lending institutions, and the federal regulatory agencies do
not make the necessary information available to adequately determine
whether or not redlining is occurring. This uncooperative attitude is
viewed as further evidence that the financial institutions are attempting
to cover up their disinvestment policies and practices and that the federal
regulatory agencies have been captured by the institutions they are
20 See S. 1281 Hearings at 830-34 (testimony of Grover Hansen).
21 Some community group research automatically equates higher interest rates, higher
down payments, and short terms with redlining. Yet, persons in the industry realize that
adroit and competitive manipulation of the "credit quartet" - down payment, length of
mortgage, rate of interest, and rate of amortization - is legitimately their life blood. See
A. AXELROD, C. BERGEn & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 103 (1971). Darel
Grothaus of Northwestern University's Center for Urban Affairs has criticized some
community action group reports as simplistic. "Rather than the conspiracy the critics
make it to be, red-lining involves a number of complex forces." Quoted in Marshall,
Mortgage Red-lining; The Urban Disinvestment Dilemma, SAVINGS AND LOAN NEWS,
June 1974, at 43.
22 The primary anti-redlining national network is National People's Action on Housing
(NPAH), based in Chicago at the National Training and Information Center, headed by
Gale Cincotta and Shel Trapp. With chapters in thirty-nine states and 104 urban areas,
NPAH provided the impetus behind passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
1975. Another national network is the Movement for Economic Justice (MEJ), which
emphasizes "greenlining campaigns" of community depositors while simultaneously with-
drawing savings accounts from institutions allegedly involved in redlining. MEJ repre-
sents a merger of holdover Alinsky tactics with a Peace Corps mentality, since many key
operatives are Peace Corps returnees. In most major cities, these networks have com-
peting local affiliates, such as Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (tied to NPAH) and
CAP (tied to MEJ) in Chicago, or Buckeye-Woodland Community Congress (tied to
NPAH) and Active Clevelanders Together (tied to MEJ) in Cleveland.
'3 See, e.g., Coalition of Neighborhoods (Cincinnati), Housing Analysis in Oakley, Bond
Hill, and Evanston (1974), in S. 1281 Hearings at 232; Oakland Training Institute, Housing
Problems in East Oakland: Research as a Basis for Community Mobilization (1974), in
S. 1281 Hearings at 433; Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance (Chicago), Savings and
Lending Information (1975); St. Ambrose Housing Aid Center (Baltimore), Foreclosures in
Baltimore City in 1974 (Mar. 1975); COMMSSION ON CATHOLIC COMMUNITY ACTION (CLEVE-
LAND), You CAN BANK ON IT: REDLINING IN CLEVELAND (1975). Public interest groups that
are not involved in direct organizing tend to produce more sophisticated research on
redlining. See, e.g., Citizens Planning and Housing Association (Baltimore), 1974 In
Retrospect: A Review of the Baltimore Mortgage Market (Apr. 1975); THE CENTER FOR NEW
CORPORATE PRIoRITIES (Los ANGELES), WHERE THE MONEY IS: MORTGAGE LENDING, Los
ANGELES COUNTY (1975).
24 "[E]vidence of intentional discrimination against particular areas has been elusive at
best." S. 1281 Hearings at 597 (testimony of Thomas R. Bomar, Chairman of Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)); Platt, Office of Housing and Urban Affairs, FHLBB J.,
Apr. 1974, at 49.
25 S. 1281 Hearings at 833 (testimony of Grover Hansen).
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empowered to regulate. When disclosure of needed data has been
mandated by governmental action, local research groups have been
more successful in accurately documenting incidences of redlining.2 6
Nonetheless, even these studies have been criticized;2 7 spokesmen for
the financial industry maintain that outsiders are incapable of ade-
quately and fairly interpreting the complexities of the loan-making
process.28
B. Perspective of Financial Institutions
The position of the financial industry on the redlining issue is a
complex one, involving at least five facets: First, as adversaries in the
controversy, financial institutions maintain that redlining is not occur-
ring and that the charges have been manufactured. Second, and at the
same time, they maintain that current procedures for urban home-loan
decision-making are legitimate business practices, even though some of
these admitted procedures are pinpointed as steps in the redlining
process. Third, private lending institutions are not responsible for
saving neighborhood housing. Fourth, it would be irresponsible for
lenders to change current policies and practices. Fifth, the current pres-
sures for disclosure and for monitoring the loan-making process are
perceived as an unjustified and expensive interference with an es-
tablished system which may result in more controversy and may even
hasten neighborhood deterioration.
The banking and lending industry has consistently maintained that
the available research studies result in insufficient proof that redlining
is occurring29 and that data has been oversimplified 0 or misinter-
preted.31  These studies are considered part of a conspiratorial war32
against "-iancial institutions. One spokesman has characterized the
available research as based -on "ever more tenuous assertions - hunches,
really"33 and has stated that the industry's position is that the charges
being leveled result from a predetermined conclusion for which proof
has been subsequently constructed. Consequently, it is asserted that
proof of redlining is so subtle because its existence is "largely imagi-
nary. "34
26 According to an analysis by the Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance in Chicago of
figures released by the FHLBB as of June 30, 1973, in ZIP code 60622, $32,840,022 had
been deposited in savings accounts, but only twenty-six conventional home loans were
granted; this represented only one cent reinvested in the community for every ninety-nine
cents invested outside the community.
27 S. 1281 Hearings at 601 (testimony of Thomas R. Bomar), 833 (testimony of Grover
Hansen).
21 S. 1281 Hearings at 811, 814 (testimony of William A. Beasman, Jr.).
29 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
a S. 1281 Hearings at 832 (testimony of Grover Hansen).
a' See id. at 828; Marshall, Mortgage Redlining; The Urban Disinvestment Dilemma,
SAVINGS AND LOAN NEWS, June 1974, at 41.
32 See S. 1281 Hearings at 834 (testimony of Grover Hansen); see id. at 842. The
redlining controversy is often cast in terms of battle by literature of anti-redlining groups.
See Progress on Anti-redlining Front Reported, JusT EcoNoMIcs, Aug. 1975, at 7.
"3 S. 1281 Hearings at 832 (testimony of Grover Hansen).
34 Id.
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Financial industry spokesmen point out that home loans in certain
urban neighborhoods involve higher administrative costs and higher
risks.35  Lending institutions must also be careful to avoid losses when
the underlying property has little or no resale value.3 6  Since the finan-
cial industry is a system comprised of private lending institutions, they
do not feel responsible for saving neighborhood housing and that gov-
ernment, with access to public resources, has the responsibility for
preserving housing in economically declining areas.37 This sector asserts
that government coercion of lending institutions to encourage approval
of urban home loans that would be defined as too risky under current
policies and procedures would be improper."8
The financial industry is convinced that its fiduciary duty to depositors
makes it irresponsible for them to change current policies and prac-
tices.3 9  Additionally, charters require that loans be safe and prudent.40
Home loan terms and rates are determined by the market,4" not by
discriminatory decisions made in smoke-filled rooms. The banking
industry is a highly competitive field in which competitors quickly
capitalize on unwise loan decisions by attracting improperly rejected
borrowers or wary depositors. 42  Sound business practice requires a
35 S. 1281 Hearings at 812 (testimony of William A. Beasman). This is validated by
independent research of Sternlieb, The Urban Financing Dilemma, in S. 1281 Hearings at
568.
36 S. 1281 Hearings at 838 (testimony of Grover Hansen). Another spokesman for the
United States League of Savings Associations in testimony before a congressional com-
mittee in May 1975 stated:
Inevitably, of course, the loan underwriting process involves an appraisal of
various trends affecting the neighborhood in which a particular property may be
located. If these trends are adverse and are deemed a threat to the value of the
property, they will be noted in the loan underwriting report and will influence
the loan decisions .... We will not make loans to our risk on buildings that are
falling down, to families that are unable to carry mortgages, and to neighborhoods
which are blighted or, within the limits of foresight, threatened with blight. We
are not social or welfare agencies.
Id. at 877 (testimony of William B. O'Connell, Public Relations Counsel to United States
League of Savings Associations) (emphasis added).
37 See id. at 819 (testimony of William A. Beasman). A spokesman for the National
Savings and Loan League has stated: "Private institutions using private funds cannot
undertake the making of social-purpose loans, much as these loans may have merit." Id.
at 843 (testimony of Grover Hansen).
Through expansion of programs like FHA and VA government-insured loans and
through use of voluntary cooperative projects like the Neighborhood Housing Service,
the government can exercise its proper role in preserving neighborhod housing. S. 1281
Hearings at 896-97 (testimony of John H. Perkins (President, Continental Illinois National
Bank & Trust Co.)). For a more detailed discussion of the Neighborhood Housing Services
program see text accompanying notes 120-22 infra.
3' The lending institutions are firmly opposed to credit allocation. They are con-
cerned that anti-redlining legislation or regulations might eventually involve neighborhood
loan quotas. S. 1281 Hearings at 846 (testimony of Grover Hansen); id. at 880 (testimony
of William B. O'Connell); id. at 891 (testimony of John H. Perkins).
31 Id. at 835 (testimony of Grover Hansen). They have a fiduciary responsibility to
their depositors or stockholders to make only sound loans, to show a profit in their business
operations, and to maintain proper reserves.
10 Id. at 878 (testimony of William B. O'Connell).
41 Id. at 835 (testimony of Grover Hansen).
42 Id. at 812 (testimony of William A. Beasman); id. at 844 (testimony of Grover Han-
sen).
[Vol, 25:110
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diversity of investments rather than a concentration of home loans in the
immediate area of loan offices 43 Partially for this reason and so that
loan money can circulate throughout the country, the government has
encouraged the development of a nationwide secondary mortgage mar-
ket.44  Federal and state supervisory authorities carefully audit loan
portfolios to ferret out unwise, risky loans,45 and thus it is contended
(somewhat illogically) that current antidiscriminatory regulations are
sufficient.46
Outside pressure has been directed toward encouraging closer moni-
toring of the loan-making process and opening it to public scrutiny.
Those exerting pressure have been perceived by the financial industry
as officious intermeddlers 47 and it has been asserted that such outsiders
do not have the perspective to properly interpret information or evaluate
current loan policies and procedures. 48 Moreover, it has been argued
that assembling data for public examination will be burdensome and
expensive for the lending institutions and the government. 49  Such inter-
ference, it has been further contended, can lead to needless controversy
and even to further neighborhood deterioration.50 As the debate con-
tinues,51 certain legislation may bear upon the outcome.
4 Id. at 894 (testimony of John H. Perkins).
44 National policy has favored the equalization of cash supply-demand imbalances by
promoting the flow of credit from "capital surplus" areas to "capital deficit" areas through
federal mechanisms such as the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae"),
the Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"), and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac").
45 S. 1281 Hearings at 878 (testimony of William B. O'Connell).
41 "It is important to note that savings associations are already subject to a body of law
and regulations which effectively prohibit redlining practices." Id.; see id. at 826 (testi-
mony of Grover Hansen).
47 It is said that without experience or justification, they are trying to interfere in the
management of a very complex system. Id. at 880 (testimony of William B. O'Connell).
4 Id. at 828 (testimony of Grover Hansen); id. at 880 (testimony of William B.
O'Connell).
4 Lending institutions have been able to document the costs of compliance with other
recent disclosure requirements such as the Truth-In-Lending Act and the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act. Substantial amounts of computer and personnel time are
already tied up in data assembly for compliance with existing regulations. The industry
has consistently contended that the cost burden will be excessive; a Senate Committee
study estimated, however, that the cost of compliance with proposed disclosure require-
ments will level out at about $180 per institution per year. S. REP. No. 94-187, supra
note 8, at 14.
50 If we introduce this "numbers game," many institutions will feel obliged to step
up lending activity. In many areas, a forced increase in lending activity will mean
- not stabilized values - but an acceleration of the process of neighborhood
change, since a marked increase in the number of loans is interpreted as a sign of
real estate "speculation" in many quarters.
S. 1281 Hearings at 879 (testimony of William B. O'Connell).
This aspect of the industry's concern was well expressed by an industry spokesman
before a congressional committee:
[Disclosure] might well lead to a destabilization of some of our financial institu-
tions and some of our neighborhoods. An improper and a narrow interpretation of
the data might lead to further and destructive divisions between cities and suburbs,
between neighborhoods and communities, between different racial and ethnic
groups, and between rich and poor. It may even set a neighborhood against itself,
creating a psychology of despair and striking at the very roots of public confidence
through the endless repetition of the "redlining" litany.
Id. at 829 (testimony of Grover Hansen).
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111. LEGISLATION
A. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
Anti-redlining measures were vigorously explored by Congress during
1975. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
conducted extensive hearings on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of
1975.52 The hearings and other steps of the legislative process pro-
vided an opportunity to assemble available research data and policy
recommendations concerning alleged redlining. Public interest or-
ganizations and community action groups presented evidence of red-
lining and supported financial institution disclosure of data on savings
deposits drawn from and home loans made into communities.s
The Act does not use the word "redlining," but it implicitly acknowl-
edges its existence.54 The heart of the Act is the requirement that
lending institutions compile and hold available for public inspection
specific data on home loans, i.e., quantity, dollar amount, location,
whether federally insured, whether to resident or absentee owners, and
whether a home improvement loan.55 The Act only applies to certain
types of lending institutions (commercial banks, savings banks, savings
and loan associations, building and loan associations, and credit unions)
which make federally related mortgage loans, 5 have offices in metro-
politan areas, 57 and have total assets of more than ten million dollars.58
Insurance companies, loan companies, many mortgage brokers, real
estate investment trusts, rural lending institutions, and small-scale loan
associations and credit unions are exempt.
The Act requires that data on the number and total dollar amount of
loans be broken down by the location of the property securing the loan
- whether or not inside the loanaking office's Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area (SMSA), as defined by the Office of Management and
s1 Marshall, Mortgage Redlining; the Urban Disinvestment Dilemma, SAVINCS AND
LOAN NEWS, June 1974, at 41; Stemlieb, The Urban Financing Dilemma, in S. 1281 Hear-
ings at 568.
52 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2809. (Pamphlet No. 1, Mar. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
HMDA]. The committee favorably reported out the bill and the Senate passed S. 1281 on
September 4, 1975. A similar bill introduced in the House in May (HR 6596) went
through several transformations (HR 7251, 7446, 7700), and ultimately appeared as Title
III of HR 10024, a complex bill introduced by Representative St. Germain dealing with
flexible regulation of interest rates and electronic fund transfers as well as home mortgage
disclosure. The House passed the measure on October 31; the conference report was
agreed to in mid-December; and it was signed into law by President Ford on December 31,
1975, as Pub.L.No. 94-200. Title III is cited as the "Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975."
53 See S. 1281 Hearings.
" The Congress finds that some depository institutions have sometimes contrib-
uted to the decline of certain geographic areas by their failure pursuant to their
chartering responsibilities to provide adequate home financing to qualified ap-
plicants on reasonable terms and conditions.
HMDA, 12 U.S.G.A. § 2801 (Pamphlet No. 1, Mar. 1976).
-5 Id. § 2803.
56 Id. §2802.
-7 Id. §2803.
-8 Id. §2808.
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Budget, and if within the SMSA, by census tract or ZIP code.59 The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is to determine where
data by census tracts can be made readily available at a reasonable
cost 6 and the federal regulatory agencies, lead by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, are to engage in research to develop improved methods
of reducing the cost of compliance with data retrieval requirements.61
Opponents of comprehensive disclosure were able to forestall early
proposals for mandatory data on savings deposits as well as loans,
6 2
for more specificity of location outside the SMSA rather than simply
"outside," 6  and for mandatory census tract identification.6 4  The
proposed areas requiring further research were pared down by eliminat-
ing research on the feasibility of disclosing the source of savings de-
posits by geographical area, 65 the practicability of requiring disclo-
sure of the average terms and downpayment ratios of mortgage loans by
geographical location,6 the use to which the data is put by local gov-
ernment agencies and community groups, and the impact of the Act on
lending patterns, defaults, or foreclosure rates. 67 Studies on the costs of
compliance and experiments to reduce expenses and difficulties for the
financial institutions replaced the eliminated research topics.
Implementation of the Act is heavily dependent on the Federal Re-
serve Board which has the general responsibility of developing regula-
tions to carry out its purpose.69 Specific emphasis has been placed on
formulating regulations on availability of data for public inspection.
70
The Board has been charged with the prevention of circumvention or
evasion, and it has the discretionary power to make adjustments and
exceptions for any class of transactions.71  Early versions of the Act,
however, placed major enforcement responsibility on the Federal Trade
Commission rather than the Federal Reserve Board.7 2 It is interesting
to note that the official position of the Federal Reserve Board during the
congressional hearings was that it did "not believe that this bill, which
apparently is based on the premise that local deposits should be used
essentially for local credit, is necessarily wise legislation." 73 The Chair-
- Id. § 2803.
60 Id.
61 Id. § 2806.
62 Draft of S. 1281, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(1) (1975).
SId. § 4(a)(2)(B), 4(a)(3)(B).
64 Mandatory census tract identification was vigorously sought by the National People's
Action on Housing network and its affiliated local community organizations.
6% S. 1281, § 7(a)(2) as reported out of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs.
66 Id. § 7(a)(3).
Id. § 7(b).
HMDA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2806 (Pamphlet No. 1, Mar. 1976).
Id. 9 2804.
70 Id. § 2803.
71 Id. § 2804.
72 Draft of S. 1281, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(d).
73 Letter from Arthur F. Bums, supra note 10, at 20 (emphasis in original).
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man of the Board listed a number of reservations about the legislation,
including a critique of disclosure: "The reporting mandated under this
bill may give misleading impressions of unfair discrimination, impres-
sions which can only be countered by the adoption of lending practices
that could seriously disadvantage local depositors.."74
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 is not in itself a prohibi-
tion on redlining, but it does provide a mechanism for gauging and pin-
pointing it.75  Public interest and community action groups will have
some of the data they need to facilitate their community organizing
strategies. Public officials empowered to designate institutions as
depositories of public funds will be able to compare the track records of
lenders on affirmative reinvestment in local communities. Although it
appears that the effectiveness of this legislation will not be immediately
evident, at least some positive steps have been taken to remedy the
situation.
B. State Legislation
Anti-redlining legislation has been proposed in at least ten states.76
Illinois has enacted the Financial Institutions Disclosure Act 77 covering
any bank, insurance company, mortgage banking company, or savings
and loan association which operates or has a place of business in Illi-
nois.78  As of January 1, 1976, each lending institution must file a
semiannual statement of the number and aggregate dollar amount of
home loan applications and of loans granted, broken down by type of
loan79 and by geographical location.80 This information will be avail-
able for public inspection in the office of the Illinois Department of
Financial Institutions and in each of the offices of reporting financial
institutions."1 The act has tough compliance measures, including the
74 Id. at 21. The Board has been given until June 29, 1976, to develop the needed
regulations and other requirements of implementation before the title takes effect.
HMDA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2808 (Pamphlet No. 1, Mar. 1976).
75 The purpose of this chapter is to provide the citizens and public officials of the
United States with sufficient information to enable them to determine whether
depository institutions are filling their obligations to serve the ihousing needs of
the communities and neighborhoods in which they are located and to assist
public officials in their determination of the distribution of public sector invest-
ments in a manner designed to improve the private investment environment.
HMDA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 2801 (Pamphlet No. 1, Mar. 1976).
76 Arizona, California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Harper, Greenbacks are Battling Red-lining, PLANNING, Aug.
1975, at 6; consultation with Shel Trapp of National Training and Information Center;
OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERVICE COMMISSION, MEMORANDUM: SURVEY OF LOAN "REDLINING"
LEGISLATION (Oct. 14, 1975).
71 Pub. L. No. 79-632, § 1 (Aug. 28, 1975).
7s Id. § 2(b).
71 (1) Loans secured by residential real estate; (2) mortgages insured by FHA; (3)
mortgages insured by VA; (4) construction loans; and (5) home improvement and re-
habilitation loans. Id. § 3.
s0 Id. §§ 2, 3 (by county, by ZIP code, and by census tract).
s
1Id. § 5.
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levying of fines against recalcitrant institutions and the imposition of
felony charges against any persons engaging in a false filing.
82
Of the proposed anti-redlining measures being considered in state
legislatures, the strongest on mandatory data disclosure is California's
Senate Bill 1003. The bill proposes to repeal a current provision in the
California Financial Code prohibiting savings and loan associations from
making loans within specified geographical areas when future loans
would constitute an unsound business practice.83 The bill states that
one of the causes of deteriorating housing stock in California is "the
failure or refusal by mortgage lending institutions to provide adequate
home financing for repair, rehabilitation and construction on a nondis-
criminatory basis for all areas within this state.-8 4 Based on the policy
consideration that mortgage lending institutions should serve the needs
of the neighborhoods in which they are located,8 5 disclosure require-
ments more comprehensive than those required by the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act of 1975 are needed in California so that "knowledgeable
citizens would then be able to exercise their consumer powers and invest
in those institutions that are committed to the housing needs of their
neighborhoods."'8 6
Each savings and loan assocation would be required to keep a loan
register available for public inspection in each office. Each loan would
require up to twenty-nine notations, including location of security prop-
erty by census tract, amount of loan, interest, loan fees, downpayment,
appraised value, age of structure, term of loan, family income, race
8 7
of applicant, and service area in which property is located.8 8  The pri-
mary service area for a lending institution is a circle with a radius of one
mile from offices located within an SMSA, a circle with a radius of two
miles from offices located outside of SMSA, or a regional shopping
center plus an area extending five miles from the perimeter of the
shopping center.8 9
This proposed bill would require savings and loan associations to
12 Statements must be verified by two officers of the institution or a licensed public
accountant. Id. § 4. Institutional fines are set at $500 or $100 per day of delinquency,
whichever is greater. Id. § 6(a). Any persons, presumably office staff as well as officers,
are regarded as guilty of a Class 4 felony for participating in the filing of a materially
false or misleading statement. 1d. § 6(b).
'3 CAL. FIN. CODE, § 7176 (West 1968).
" Cal. S.B. 1003, § 5, at 5 (April 16, 1975) (proposed CAL. FIN. CODE § 8725).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Race is classified as "Caucasian, Black, Mexican-American - Other," id. § 5, at 8
(proposed CAL. FIN. CODE § 8731).
8 Id. § 2, at 2 (proposed CAL. FIN. CODE § 8703.3).
89 Id. § 5, at 6 (proposed CAL. FIN. CODE § 8728). Each institution is required to have
for public inspection certain demographic statistics on the primary service area that would
be useful for comparison with patterns disclosed in the institution's loan register. Id. § 5,
at 9 (proposed CAL. FIN. CODE § 8732). This section would require the following statistics
on the primary service area: (1) the mean and median age of the residents; (2) the mean
and median family size; (3) the mean, median, and adjusted gross income per capita
per household; (4) the population; and (5) the racial, marital status, and sex composition,
by percentages.
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prepare a quarterly "Statement of Geographical Investment Pattern,"
describing the geographic sources and distributions of deposits and
loans for each office in terms of economic, social, and lending factors.
The statement would be a compilation of data in the loan register plus
some technical analysis. 90 It must be available in each office for public
inspection and the already required mailing or publication of an annual
financial statement would include a notice that the Statement of Geo-
graphical Investment Pattern is available to the public.9 1
The data requirements of the bill are quite extensive, yet they apply
only to loans granted. Rejected loan applications or pre-application
discouragements are not covered by the provision. The bill lacks stiff
compliance mechanisms and has no leverage over the status of financial
institutions as depositories of public funds. The real teeth of the bill
are found primarily in the broad scope of data to be disclosed to con-
sumer power-oriented Californians.
C. Local Legislation
The prototype for municipal anti-redlining ordinances is Chicago's
1974 Ordinance 92 requiring that each bid for a share as a depository of
Chicago's city or school board funds be accompanied by data on an
institution's loans, savings accounts, and checking accounts. Loans are
classified by type (residential mortgage, construction, home improve-
ment, consumer, or commercial) and whether conventional or FHA-VA.
Data is assembled on total loan amounts, down payments, interest rates,
and loan terms. The location of the security properties and the offices
holding the savings and checking accounts are stated by census tract
within the city of Chicago or, if outside, whether or not within the six
county SMSA. The effect of this ordinance is that those who allocate
public funds for deposit in local institutions have access to statistical
profiles on each bidder that indicate the neighborhood wources of de-
posits and the locational pattern of loan-making. Each bidder is also
required to submit a signed anti-redlining pledge.93
The City Council of Cleveland, Ohio also recently enacted a red-
lining ordinance. 94 Modelled on the Chicago prototype, the Cleveland
ordinance requires the same data on loans and deposit accounts. The
only difference in the reporting requirements is that locations outside the
city are to be classified as inside or outside Cuyahoga County, not the
larger four county SMSA.15 The Cleveland ordinance also requires a
nondiscrimination pledge with each bid.96
1o Id. § 5, at 5-9 (proposed CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 8726-31).
91 Id. § 3, at 4 (proposed CAL. FIN. CODE § 8714).
92 CHICAGO, ILL. CODE §§ 7-30 to 7-36 (1974).
93 Id. § 7-34.1.
94 Cleveland, Ohio Ordinance No. 1135-75, §§ 1.231601-1.231603, Apr. 28, 1976.
I- Chicago requires reporting on locations outside the city to be classified as within or
without a six county SMSA.
11 Cleveland, Ohio Ordinance No. 1135-75, § 1.231602, Apr. 28, 1976. The pledge is
identical to the Chicago pledge.
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Cleveland's ordinance, however, goes further than the Chicago or-
dinance in two critical respects. The ordinance prevents any institution
not complying with the disclosure requirements from being considered
an eligible depository of city funds, 97 whereas the Chicago Comptroller
can designate depositories "as he deems advisable and for the best
interests of the City."98  The Cleveland ordinance also recommends
that the city analyze the relative internal and external proportion of
deposits to home loans and if the city-suburban comparison of a par-
ticular institution "does not bear a reasonable and fair relationship," 9
its bid should be refused as not being in the public interest.
IV. FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
While most states have regulatory agencies to supervise state-char-
tered financial institutions, the principal regulatory thrust comes from
the federal agencies. 100 The Comptroller of the Currency regulates na-
tional banks, the Federal Reserve Board regulates state-chartered com-
mercial banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulates the remainder of the
state-chartered commercial banks. The Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB) comprehensively regulates federally-chartered savings
and loan associations and additionally exercises some regulatory control
over state-chartered associations that insure deposits with the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Of all federal regulatory
agencies, the FHLBB has the greatest impact upon urban home loans.
Despite the acceleration of housing and neighborhood deterioration,
the growing indications of redlining, and their responsibility to further
federal housing policies, federal agencies did not begin to seriously
address the red-lining question until prodded by public interest organiza-
tions. Although the National Urban League, frustrated by repeated
blockage in its efforts to study home mortgage practices in the Bronx,
New York, unsuccessfully pressured the FHLBB for assistance, their
efforts brought the issue of the Board's role in the redlining controversy
into the fore. 01 In 1971, the Center for National Policy Review, repre-
senting thirteen public interest groups,10 2  invoked administrative
7 Id. § 1.231603.
9 CHICAGO, ILL. CODE § 7-36 (1974).
9 Cleveland, Ohio Ordinance No. 1135-75, § 1.231603, Apr. 28, 1976. This ordinance
had been locked in the legislative process in Cleveland City Council due to a prolonged
controversy among politicians, lending institutions, and community action groups.
100 State regulatory agencies in Illinois, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts have issued anti-
redlining regulations and established investigatory procedures. For example, the Com-
missioner of the Illinois Savings and Loan Association in 1974, issued pointed anti-red-
lining regulations for state-chartered savings and loan associations requiring that each
association retain all rejected loan applications with written memoranda in support of the
rejection for twenty four months, allowing ample time for state auditors to review files
and check for compliance with the regulations.
01 Statement of Ronald Brown (Director, Washington Bureau of National Urban League),
in S. 1281 Hearings at 522.
"' Searing, Discrimination in Home Finance, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1113, 1120 n.39
(1973).
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processes by petitioning the four federal regulatory agencies in order to
force them to use their rulemaking authority to develop regulations aimed
at preventing discrimination in home finance.'0 A remedy suggested
by the petitions included a data retrieval system, the maintenance of
written logs of oral inquiries about loans which do not result in a written
application, a specification of loan decision criteria, affirmative action
devices, and compliance guarantees.10 4
While these petitions were pending, the agencies were also under
pressure from the United States Commission on Civil Rights and the
Civil Rights Oversight Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee. In response, the regulatory agencies published general nondis-
criminatory policy statements.0 5 Frustrating delays have been docu-
mented by counsel for the Center for National Policy Review, who after two
years concluded: "At first glance, it does not appear that much has
been done to end discrimination in home finance,"' 0 6 but his dis-
appointment was tempered with "cautious optimism,"107 because the
entire process had demonstrated the potential of utilizing administrative
law to supplement the standard civil rights strategy of litigation and
legislation.
A. Federal Home Loan Bank Board Regulations
The major result of public interest group pressure was the issuance
by the FHLBB of nondiscriminatory regulations that prohibit discrimina-
tory practices in fixing the amount, interest, and duration of home
loans. 10 8 Unequal treatment based on the racial or ethnic character of
the applicant, present or prospective occupants of the dwelling, or "the
present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants, or occupants of other
dwellings in the vicinity" is also proscribed in application, collection,
and enforcement procedures. 10 9
The FHLBB regulations have provided a legal basis for anti-redlining
litigation. 10 Additionally, General Counsel of the Board has issued a
memorandum opinion on the applicability of these regulations to the
practice of redlining by member financial institutions,"' stating that
"03 Id. at 1120.
104 Id. at 1121-22.
105 Id. at 1129 n.96.
10 Id. at 1143.
1'o Id.
1- 12 C.F.R. § 528 (1975).
10 Id. § 528.2(a)(4). In an interpretive guideline, the FHLBB has declared:
Refusal to lend in a particular area solely because of the age of the homes or the
income level in a neighborhood may be discriminatory in effect since minority
group persons are more likely to purchase used housing and to live in low-income
neighborhoods. The racial composition of the neighborhood where the loan is to
be made is always an improper underwriting consideration.
Id. § 531.8(c)(6).
110 Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio, 1976). For a dis-
cussion of the case see text accompanying notes 127-55 infra.
"I' Memorandum from Charles E. Allen (FHLBB General Counsel) to Richard Platt, Jr.
(Director, Office of Housing and Urban Affairs), Mar. 21, 1974. This memorandum dealt
strictly with economic redlining.
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redlining violates section 528.2, even when the "ostensible reason for
redlining is an apparently neutral standard applied in a discriminatory
manner. ' 112 Statistical evidence may raise a presumption that a lending
institution is practicing redlining, shifting the burden of proof to the
institution to establish that redlining does not exist. 1 3
B. Fair Housing Lending Practices Pilot Project
In addition to compiling regulations, the federal agencies agreed to a
joint Fair Housing Lending Practices Pilot Project in eighteen target
metropolitan areas. The first to be released was the report of the United
States Comptroller of the Currency, surveying all reported housing loan
applications made from June to November 1974, in six SMSA's: Bridge-
port, Connecticut; Cleveland, Ohio; Tucson, Arizona; Memphis, Tennes-
see; Montgomery, Alabama; Topeka, Kansas. 1 4
Analysis of this project discloses several critical flaws. The data
gathered was of such poor quality that 31 percent of the questionnaires
had to be excluded because of inconsistency or incompleteness."15 The
discretion of loan officers in filing applications with the Comptroller's
office remained unchecked," 6 and there was no official audit to ensure
compliance." 17 The possibility of early discouragement of persons seek-
ing loans was not recorded in the study; only written applications were
surveyed." 8 Some institutions claimed up to 100 percent acceptance
rates, leaving the unavoidable implication that the records of refusal
were ignored or destroyed." 9
The Comptroller's office decided not to release data on the geo-
graphical location of housing properties involved, arguing a right to
privacy on behalf of the loan applicants.12 0  The agency's computer
tapes contain the location of the properties by ZIP code and by census
tract, but this information has not been made available. Locational
1l2 Id. at 1 n.I.
"3 Analysis of the discriminatory effects of redlining should begin with a compari-
son of the racial or ethnic composition of the population in the redlined neighbor-
hood with the racial or ethnic composition of the population in the member insti-
tution's effective lending territory .... Whenever a substantial disparity
between the population of the redlined neighborhood and that of the effective
lending territory exists, the association must come forward with evidence of non-
discrimination in compliance with section 528.2(d).
Id. at 8-9. Section III of the memorandum comprehensively analyzed the relationship be-
tween statistical evidence and the burden of proof in anti-discrimination cases. See also
Montlack, Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce the Laws Against Discrimination, 22
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 259 (1973).
114 U.S. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FAIR HoUSING LENDINc PAcTrICES PILOT Paoj-
Ecr, SuRvEY C APPROACH 11.1 (1975).
115 Id. at 111.7.
"8 Id. at 111.2.
"I Id. at 111.3.
il8 Id. at 111.7.
"I The study admitted the suspect nature of these claims of high acceptance rates.
Id. at 111.3. Indeed, the study concluded that "it cannot be assumed that all or even a
majority of the forms were filled out precisely as requested," Id. at 111.2.
120 Telephone conversations with Gary C. Wilson (Project Director, Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency).
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data was the most frequently missed item in incomplete surveys, even
though recording the addresses of property would seem to have been an
easy step in completing the survey. This naturally raises the question
whether the financial institutions purposely withheld sensitive informa-
tion. The lack of locational information makes the study relatively
worthless in determining the extent of redlining or neighborhood dis-
investment in the six target cities. 12
C. Neighborhood Housing Services
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board was in need of a positive pro-
gram in response to the anti-redlining pressure from public interest and
community action groups. The Board was aware of a program in Pitts-
burgh called Neighborhood Housing Services, Inc. (NHS) that had
succeeded in stimulating voluntary cooperation from lending institutions
in making home loans to a deteriorating neighborhood in the city's North
Side. The organization was formed in 1968 as a private, non-profit
corporation to stimulate reinvestment by lending institutions in the com-
munity and to provide alternate sources of home improvement loans
for neighborhood residents considered "unbankable" even by generally
cooperative lending institutions. Without using confrontation tactics,
NHS succeeded in reversing the deterioration trend by halting resi-
dential abandonment, improving the housing stock, and broadening lend-
ing policies of local financial institutions. 12 2 In 1972 the FHLBB used the
Pittsburgh experience as a model for formation of NHS pilot projects
in Cincinnati, Oakland, Dallas, and Washington, D.C.123
The heart of the NHS approach is to develop positive relationships
among community residents, local government officials, and lending
institutions. The community must voluntarily direct its energies toward
maintaining properties. In addition local governments must pledge con-
centrated city services and extra housing inspectors in the selected
target areas while lending institutions agree to maximize home loans in
the community. The FHLBB provided start-up funds, and local founda-
tions along with the financial institutions accumulated funds for fully
staffed field offices.
The formation of the Urban Reinvestment Task Force in early 1974
brought the Department of Housing and Urban Development into a
cooperative arrangement with the FHLBB, wherein HUD committed a
substantial funding pool for high-risk revolving loan funds in individual
21 In fact, spokesmen for the federal regulatory agencies urged that anti-redlining
disclosure legislation be delayed until the results of the Fair Housing Lending Practices
Pilot Project were released. See, e.g., letter from Frank Wille (Chairman, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp.) to William Proxmire (Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs), May 22, 1975, in S. 1281 Hearings at 19-20; id. at 594-611 (testimony of Thomas
Bomar (Chairman, FHLBB)).
122 Dunlop, A Success Story: Pittsburgh's Neighborhood Housing Services, FOUNDATON
NEWS, Oct. 1974, at 49, in S. 1281 Hearings at 776.
123 McNeirney, Neighborhood Housing Services, FHLBB J., May 1973, at 13, in S. 1281
Hearings at 760.
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NHS projects for loans to "unbankable" residents." 4 By mid-1975,
NHS programs were operational in eleven cities, with twelve others in
advanced stages of development.
25
The early track record of NHS is encouraging.12 6  Lending institu-
tions have found that participation is economically sound and an aid
in protecting previously made loans secured by properties in the target
area. The definitions of "bankable" or "high-risk" loans are not fixed;
thus, availability of the high-risk loan fund might cause institutional
loan officers to absolve themselves from making some loans that ought
to be made through conventional channels. It can be anticipated that
pressure will grow for creation of more NHS projects, for expanded
project boundaries, and for use of community development block grant
funds to supplement NHS financial resources.
V. EMERGING AREAS OF LrrIGATION
In addition to the legal issues raised by legislative or regulatory in-
tervention, various litigation strategies are available to persons or groups
encountering the practice of redlining. Redlining may be a violation of
the civil rights of a loan applicant or of Sherman Act antitrust provisions.
The use of community development block grants by local governments
can also be monitored for their impact on the home loan policies and
practices of lending institutions.
A. Civil Rights Violations
1. Section 1982 Actions
It is unclear whether redlining is actionable as a violation of section
1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.127 After a century of obscurity,
the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 28 upheld the
application of section 1982 to private acts of discrimination in the sale
or rental of housing. The Court stated, however, that section 1982 "does
not refer explicitly to discrimination in financing arrangements,"' 29
and a split in recent circuit court decisions has clouded the issue in
relation to alleged discrimination in home financing, especially when
the redlining is primarily economic and only indirectly racial.
30
124 HUD Backs Board in Neighborhood Preservation Plan, FHLBB J., May 1974, at
13, in S. 1281 Hearings at 758.
125 S. 1281 Hearings at 609 (testimony of Thomas Bomar).
12 Community action groups have generally rejected the obvious negative alternative of
branding NHS as tokenism or a smokescreen and have opted for positive participation in
site and staff selection and in monitoring the loan-making process.
127 "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Terri-
tory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and con-
vey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
128 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
129 Id. at 413.
0 Compare Love v. De Carlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1115 (1974) with Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). For an analysis of this split in decisions, see Duncan,
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2. Title VIII of Civil Rights Act of 1968
The 1968 Civil Rights Act' 3 ' appears to be more applicable to redlining.
A redlining case based on this Act now pending in Cincinnati, Laufman
v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 3 2 has been characterized as a landmark
case with national implications.13 3
Plaintiffs were two white couples: one, the owners, and the other, the
prospective purchasers of a residential property located in a racially
integrated neighborhood in Cincinnati. According to the complaint, in
February 1974, plaintiffs contracted to purchase the home and were
advised by agents of defendant loan association that loans with attrac-
tive terms were readily available. 3 4 When plaintiffs made a written
application for such a loan the application was rejected because of the
racial composition of the neighborhood. Consequently, plaintiffs had to
secure a loan elsewhere at a higher interest rate. Both the prospective
purchasers and the owners filed a class action suit on behalf of them-
selves and all other prospective purchasers or homeowners in racially
integrated or predominantly black neighborhoods in Cincinnati, alleging
Hood, & Neet, Redlining Practices, Racial Resegregation, and Urban Decay: Neighborhood
Housing Services as a Viable Alternative, 7 URBAN LAw. 510, 524-27 (1975). One com-
mentator has argued that redlining is proscribed by section 1982, finding support in Sul-
livan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (park membership exclusion); Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d
324 (7th Cir. 1974). Doehrman, Redlining: Potential Civil Rights and Sherman Act Viola-
tions Raised by Lending Policies, 8 IND. L. REv. 1045 (1975).
131 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 3604-05 (Supp. IV 1974).
132 No. C-1-74-153 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 13, 1976).
133 Cincinnati Lawsuit Attacks Redlining, TRENDS IN HOUSINc, May-June 1974, at 1.
The court's order of September 8, 1975,-granting the United States its application to file
a brief amicus curiae, stated that the issue of whether the Fair Housing Act of 1968
prohibits the practice of redlining is a question of first impression and one in which the
United States has a vital interest.
The National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing (NCDH) stressed the racial
connection of redlining. The United States in its brief also used the term "racial redlin-
ing." Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co.,
408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
In contrast the FHLBB emphasized economic redlining:
The term "redlining" is derived from the practice of marking maps with red lines
to indicate areas which are believed to involve high risk to lenders. Redlined
areas are usually older city neighborhoods or suburbs, and often are areas which
are changing in racial composition. It is beyond dispute that the lack of invest-
ment funds has the effect of discouraging new residents and businessmen from
moving into a neighborhood and often hastens the decay of the neighborhood and
its transformation into a slum . . . . [A] lender's determination that an area is
deteriorating may become a self-fulfilling prophecy . . . . [R]edlining by finan-
cial institutions often results in panic selling by existing home owners ... and
absentee ownership . . . .The foregoing analysis, we suggest, demonstrates
that redlining practices so affect the home-financing policy of an institution as
to make it inconsistent with "sound and economic home-financing" .. ..Thus
individuals may profit from discriminatory redlining, but society as a whole suf-
fers economic loss, since, as noted above, lack of mortgage funds in a neighbor-
hood often leads to speculation, deterioration, and abandonment.
Brief of FHLBB as Amicus Curiae at 12-15, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408
F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). See also note 1 supra.
134 The agents had allegedly offered a 90% loan at 8.5% interest with 3% closing costs,
which amounted to attractive terms in early 1974. Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Opposi-
tion to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan
Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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that the lending institution was engaged in the practice of refusing to
lend money or requiring stricter terms for the purchase of homes in these
neighborhoods.
The relief sought in the suit is a combination of compensatory and
punitive damages, a declaration that the building and loan company's
alleged policy and practice are invalid, and an injunction against con-
tinuing the practice. The complaint also asks that the lending institu-
tion correct the effects of past discriminatory conduct through imple-
mentation of a comprehensive affirmative action plan to promote equal
opportunities in housing.
The threshold issue in this case was whether redlining created a cause
of action under the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968. The dispute
crystalized as defendant lending institution filed for summary judgment
claiming that the allegations in the complaint did not state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.1 35 In denying the motion, the court
emphasized the racial connection in redlining,136 linking it with "white
flight"'137 and ultimately with urban decay.
Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 has the broad purpose of
providing comprehensive prohibitions against all forms of housing dis-
crimination, which would encompass redlining. 3s  The Supreme Court
has described the Fair Housing Act as a "detailed housing law, applicable
to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable by a com-
plete arsenal of federal authority.."139
Neither the term redlining, nor the phenomenon the term stands for,
appears in Title VIII, nor was the practice directly confronted during the
legislative development of the Fair Housing Act. After an extensive
examination of the legislative history, however, the brief for the United
States concluded: "[W]hile the legislative history does not specifically
address the practice of racial redlining by name or direct description, it
does reflect an emphatic Congressional rejection of the premise on which
that practice is based."' 40  The FHLBB brief similarly concluded that
"Title VIII was intended, in part, to provide a comprehensive prohibition
135 On Feb. 13, 1976, defendants motions for dismissal and for summary judgment
were denied.
136 See notes 1 and 133 supra.
137 Little imagination is required to understand that the imposition of barriers to
occupancy in the form of higher mortgage-interest rates or refusals to make loans
in connection with housing in changing neighborhoods works to discourage fam-
ilies, white or black, which could afford to purchase homes in such neighborhoods.
The practical effect is to discourage whites - who may freely move elsewhere -
from moving into vacancies in "changing" neighborhoods, thereby inducing
"massive transition" and, ultimately, "white flight." Thus, according to this
view, redlining directly contribututes to the decay of our cities.
408 F. Supp. 489, 496-97.
I" Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1974).
139 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 (1968). For other judicial pro-
nouncements on the breadth of Title VIII, see Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972); Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1247 (6th Cir.
1974); Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
140 Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co.,
408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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against various forms of discrimination, including redlining, in connec-
tion with home financing."'141
Judge Porter's treatment in Laufrman of the legislative history of the
1968 Act did not explicitly reach the same conclusion, yet the opinion
did seem to endorse a broad construction of the Fair Housing Act. The
opinion indirectly and with some ambiguity stated that the legislative
history of the Act indicates a congressional intent to prohibit redlining.142
The court additionally chose to interpret the act broadly-' 43
The relevant sections of Title VIII are three in number. The district
court held that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under section 804.144
Subsection (a) of that section reads in part:
[I]t shall be unlawful: (a) to refuse to sell or rent after the
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale
or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.145
The "otherwise make unavailable" clause has consistently been broadly
read by courts to include practices that go beyond merely refusing to
rent or sell housing because of racial discrimination.146  The fact that
plaintiffs in Laufman are nonminority does not disqualify them from
protection under this section, since "it is immaterial under the statute
whether a loan application to purchase a dwelling is turned down be-
'4' Brief of FHLBB as Amicus Curiae at 4, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408
F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
142 408 F. Supp. at 501.
143 Plaintiffs urge that the Fair Housing mandate of this Act be given a liberal in-
terpretation to effectuate the purposes of Congress. Defendants argue that its
terms should be construed niggardly. The plaintiffs have the more persuasive
position and, accordingly, the Court will, if necessary to interpret the language
used by Congress, give the provisions of the act "a generous construction."
408 F. Supp. at 497, quoting Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212
(1972).
144 If the plain meaning of § 3604 [804] is observed, it becomes clear that plain-
tiffs have stated a cause of action under its terms. The cost of housing being
what it is today, a denial of financial assistance in connection with a sale of a
home would effectively "make unavailable or deny" a "dwelling." When such
denial occurs as a result of racial considerations, § 360 4(a) is transgressed.
408 F. Supp. at 493.
145 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (Supp. IV 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970) (emphasis
added).
146 Section 3604 applies to racially exclusionary land use practices of a municipality,
United States v. City of Parma, P-H EQUAL Opp. HOusING REP. 13,616 (N.D. Ohio 1973);
to racial steering, Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553, 556-57 (E.D. Mich. 1973); to dis-
crimination in an orphanage, United States v. Hughes Memorial Home, P-H EQUAL OPP.
HOUSING REP. 1 13,708 (W.D. Va. 1975); to trailer park discrimination, United States v.
Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130 (M.D. Fla. 1972); to notification of rental security deposit
requirements, United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
The language "appears to be as broad as Congress could have made it, and all practices
which have the effect of denying dwellings on prohibited grounds are therefore unlaw-
ful." United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
modified per curiam, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975). This language is repeated in United
States v. City of Parma, P-H EQUAL Opp. HoUsINc REPs. 13,616, at 14,015 (N.D. Ohio
1973).
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cause of the race of the proposed borrower or because of his prospective
neighbors.' 14
7
The next relevant part of Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act is section
805 which makes it unlawful for any
building and loan association to deny a loan . . . to a
person applying therefor for the purpose of purchasing . . . a
dwelling . . . because of the race . . . of such person . . . or
of the present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants, or occu-
pants of the dwelling or dwellings in relation to which such loan
is to be made or given. 4 '
The Laufman order and opinion is the first direct judicial interpreta-
tion of section 805. While the language is ambiguous, plaintiffs argued
that it should be "generously" construed under the Trafficante rule, 49
to include prohibition of loan refusals based on the race of present or
future occupants of dwellings in the surrounding neighborhood.1
5 0
Great weight was given the agencies' interpretations of this section
51
and the court's analysis went beyond direct racial discrimination into
the sublties of redlining, including denial of loans to nonminority persons
who wished to finance the purchase of homes in integrated neighbor-
hoods.152
The court also noted enactment of the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act of 1975 and considered what insight its passage might give on
Congress' attitude towards redlining. The court concluded that it was
consistent with their belief that the legislature was gravely concerned
about the persistence of such discrimination.mn5
147 Brief of FHLBB as Amicus Curiae at 5, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co. 408 F.
Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976). See' also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 212 (1972).
41 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (Supp. IV 1974), amending 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1970) (emphasis
added).
149 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972).
1-50 See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 20-22, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. &
Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
151 After applying rules of statutory construction, the FHLBB concluded:
It therefore is clear that Congress intended to bar actions such as "redlining"
where a lender refuses to make a loan based on consideration of the racial char-
acteristics of the occupants of dwellings "in relation to" which the loan is to be
made, that is, of the residents of the neighborhood in which the property is lo-
cated .... [T]he practice of "redlining" - where race is a factor - is clearly
prohibited by § 3605 ....
Brief of FHLBB as Amicus Curiae at 7-8, Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp.
489 (S.D. Ohio 1976), (HUD and FHLBB regulations summarized 408 F. Supp. at 491-95.
152 408 F. Supp. at 492. Defendants vigorously argued that Congress had not intended
to prohibit redlining as evidenced by its failure to explicitly incorporate redlining in the
enumeration of practices prohibited by the section. Id. at 492.
'53 Id. at 498:
We conclude that this new Act indicates at the least a grave concern with redlin-
ing and the legislative debates in both houses prior to its passage indicate a strong
disapproval of redlining where it exists. The main purpose of the Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act of 1975 is to make visible where the practice does exist.
This purpose is not inconsistent with Congress' having intended to outlaw red-
lining earlier by passing the Fair Housing Act . . . thus, after careful analysis
1976]
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Redlining might also be a violation of section 3617 of Title VIII by
interfering with the right to voluntary interracial association, as pro-
tected under Trafficante and often argued in fair housing cases involving
zoning and racial steering.'5 4 The court agreed that denial of a loan to
the white couple because of the racial composition of the neighborhood
amounted to interference with Trafficante-protected rights of interracial
association and related benefits. 155
3. Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964
Moreover, redlining might be actionable as violative of Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.15 6  An institution like defendant Oakley
Building and Loan Company participates in the Federal Home Loan Bank
System and thereby receives loans and advances which constitute federal
financial assistance within the meaning of the Title. When race is in
any way a ground for refusal of a home loan application, such a decision
by a loan officer of a federally funded institution could be a violation of
the Civil Rights Act. 157
Judge Porter found defendant subject to Title VI prohibitions and that
plaintiffs had standing thereunder) 58  He further stated that "[u]n-
questionably, a denial of federal assistance to loan applicants on the
basis of the racial composition of the neighborhood would constitute
'discrimination.' "159 The great significance of the Laufman case may
lie in the guidance it provides for future redlining lawsuits since it
indicates a wide range of possible remedies.
4. Business Necessity Defense
The most viable defense available to lending institutions facing a
redlining suit based on factual practices is "business necessity." Federal
courts have recognized this as an affirmative defense in employment6 °
... we find it to be consistent with our foregoing interpretation of the Fair
Housing Act ....
154 Heights Community Congress v. Rosenblatt Realty, Inc., P-H EQUAL Opp. HOUSING
REP. 13,702 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. Robbins, P-H EQUAL Opp. HOUSING REP.
13,655 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553, 556-57 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
155 408 F. Supp. at 497. See also Smith v. Stechel, 510 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1975);
Tokaji v. Toth, P-H EQUAL Opp. HOUSING REP. $ 13,679 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
156 No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan-
cial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
'17 In an education discrimination case, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the
Supreme Court relied on regulations and guidelines of the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare pursuant to Title VI to hold that a local school board violated the
civil rights of non-English speaking students. In the redlining situation, the FHLBB
has issued regulations and guidelines that the practice is a civil rights violation. See
notes 108-112 supra and accompanying text.
15 408 F. Supp. 498-99.
' Id. at 499.
G6 Criggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); United States v. St. Louis -
S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); United
States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
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and housing discrimination cases.'"' The FHLBB regulatory standards
also acknowledge this defense. "A [home loan] standard which has a
discriminatory effect is not necessarily improper if its use achieves a
genuine business need which cannot be achieved by means which are
not discriminatory in effect or less discriminatory in effect."' 62  It
should be noted, however, that this is limited by the requirement that
there not be alternative means available to achieve the same end with
less discriminatory impact.'6'
Lending institutions can argue that their urban home loan policies
and practices are required by the necessities of the housing credit
market, and that prudent underwriting requires acknowledgment that
certain community conditions weaken the security for a loan afforded
by the property. The proximity of abandoned buildings in a blighted
community, for example, plus data on the incidence of arson in aban-
doned buildings in that community, could be the basis for a solid business
necessity defense despite the personal financial profile of an applicant.
Lending officials have been forewarned by the General Counsel of the
FHLBB, however, that allowance of the business necessity defense will
be restricted.16
The growing presence of programs like the Neighborhood Housing
Service, community development corporations, and even the very com-
munity organizations that are raising the redlining issue undercuts the
business necessity defense. Cooperation in a positive voluntary partner-
ship with local government and community groups is an alternate method
available to achieve legitimate business objectives with less discrimina-
tory impact than redlining. These cooperative programs can improve
community characteristics by protecting the properties that should serve
as security for home loans.
B. Redlining as a Violation of the Sherman Act
The practice of redlining may additionally violate the Sherman Act' 65
as a conspiracy in restraint of competition. Though actual application of
the Sherman Act to alleged redlining has not yet occurred, features of
161 See Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. I11. 1969).
162 12 C.F.R. § 531.8(b) (1975).
163 United States v. St. Louis - S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972). See also
Doehrman, supra note 126, at 1064, n.84; Allen, supra note 111, at 6.
164 It is highly unlikely that any legitimate business purpose could be served by the
practice of redlining ... which cannot be achieved by nondiscriminatory, or
less discriminatory means .... There is substantial legal precedent for the
Board to presume that redlining that is discriminatory in effect is unlawful (with-
out any countervailing business purpose) and to shift the burden to the institu-
tion to demonstrate some reasonable, genuine business purpose for redlining.
In any case, such a business necessity would not be established by the institu-
tion's unsubstantiated belief that no profitable loans could be made in a given
area.
Allen, supra note 111, at 6-7.
165 "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1971).
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the redlining process can arguably fall within the coverage of the anti-
trust act.
68
Home mortgages or home improvement loans have been found to be
within the scope of "trade or commerce."' 7  If lending institutions of a
city operated under even a tacit agreement to restrain the granting of
home loans in particular geographical areas, evidence of that concerted
policy could be sufficient to establish a conspiracy with anti-competitive
effect.'61 Further, interstate investment flows and the nationwide
secondary mortgage market could be used to establish redlining as a
"conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states."'69
When scrutiny is directed toward the effect on the loan applicants, a
concerted policy of refusing home loans to parties on properties in.
certain neighborhoods or dealing with a redlined community's present
or prospective property owners only on terms of excessively high down
payment, high interest, or short loan life falls within the area of group
boycotts of third parties or of combined agreements to deal only on
onerous terms with third parties.170  These latter activities have been
held actionable under the Sherman Act.17 1 If scrutiny is directed toward
the terms of a loan, then a concerted policy of redlining could be tested
for illegal price fixing (price of credit) 172 or an illegal tying arrange-
ment (housing is tied to credit).17 3  The jump from commercial competi-
tion to home loan decision-making raises serious legal problems of
standing. 74 A litigant seeking the equitable remedy of an injunction,
however, would have less difficulty establishing standing. 75
If the lending institutions in a community are confronted with
,66 Doehrman, supra note 130, at 1053-62.
16' Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723, 724 (6th Cir. 1967); Con-
tract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. I11. 1969). See Saliterman, Some
Antitrust Problems in Government Insured/Guaranteed Mortgage Lending, 23 BUFFALO L.
REV. 119 (1973).
I" Even though there is brisk competition in some phases of the savings and lending
industry, institutions in a metropolitan area often organize "clearinghouses" or some other
method of havingregular meetings to discuss common problems and policies. If a lend-
ing institution developed a redlining policy totally within itself without sharing in an in-
formation pool or a mutual agreement with other institutions, the redlining practices
would not be actionable under the Sherman Act.
" Housing discrimination is always localized because of the fixed position of hous-
ing, but courts have held that discrimination in a local area can have enough impact on
interstate commerce to meet the interstate requirement of the Sherman Act. See
Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967); Contract Buyers
League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
70 Doehrman, supra note 130, at 1055-56.
171 Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723, 724 (6th Cir. 1967).
172 Doehrman, supra note 130, at 1056; cf. United States v. Container Corp. of America,
393 U.S. 333 (1969).
113 In dictum, the Supreme Court in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 508 (1969) stated that credit could be in a tying arrangement with a
tangible commodity. See also Saliterman, supra note 167, at 128.
174 Note, Standing to Sue for Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 570 (1964).
175 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1975); see In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31,
481 F.2d 122, 126 (9th Cir. 1973); Doehrman, supra note 130, at 1060.
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Sherman Act litigation by either individual or class claimants, they have
available four possible defense strategies: first, attack allegations of an
anticompetitive conspiracy; second, argue that loan decisions in an indi-
vidual neighborhood do not have an interstate effect; third, argue that
the terms of credit are set by free market mechanisms that naturally
react to community characteristics; fourth, argue the affirmative defense
of business necessity.17
6
C. Redlining and Community Development Block Grants
Another emerging method for legally halting redlining is through the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.17 7 The Act's primary
objective is "the development of viable urban communities, by providing
decent housing and a suitable living environment and expanding eco-
nomic opportunities, principally for persons of low and moderate in-
come."'17  Specific objectives include the prevention of neighborhood
deterioration, 179 revitalization of deteriorating neighborhoods,18 0 con-
servation of existing housing stock,' 8' and the "reduction of the isolation
of income groups within communities and geographical areas and the
promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighbor-
hoods. '"1 8 2  Grants are made to local governments to fund projects
aimed at halting housing abandonment and neighborhood decline.
During the first fiscal year of operation under the Act, many city gov-
ernments used part of their community development block grants to
guarantee home improvement loans made by private lending institutions.
The Act itself has a general nondiscrimination requirement. 8 3 Regu-
lations apply the nondiscrimination clause to private contractors re-
ceiving community development funds or loans. 8 4 Hence, lending in-
stitutions participating in a home improvement loan guarantee program
would fit in this category. Recipients are forbidden to "restrict in any
way access to, or . . . the enjoyment of any advantage or privilege en-
joyed by others in connection with facilities, services, financial aid or
other benefits."'8 5  Affirmative action is mandated for recipients, 86
and the regulations acknowledge that recipients might have to take
action "to ameliorate an imbalance in services or facilities provided to
175 See text accompanying notes 160-64 supra for the business necessity defense of
civil rights violation suits.
177 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
178 24 C.F.R. § 570.2(a) (1975).
"I Id. § 570.2(a)(1).
1s0 Id. § 570.2(a)(6).
1sI Id. § 570.2(a)(3).
182 Id. § 570.2(a)(6).
113 Section 109 of the [Act] requires that no person in the United States shall on
the ground of race, color, national origin or sex be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any pro-
gram or activity funded in whole or in part with community development funds.
Id. § 570.601(a).
184 Id.
Is5 Id. § 570.601(b)(4)(iv).
186 ld. § 570.601(b)(4)(i).
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any geographical area or specific group of persons.."1 8 7  Redlining
creates imbalances in loanmaking services provided to geographical
areas. Further, the regulations forbid locational choices that are dis-
criminatory or that impair the accomplishment of the objectives of the
Act. 88 Redlining practices would fall squarely within this prohibition.
If recipients do not comply with the nondiscrimination requirements,
the Secretary of HUD is authorized to refer the matter to the governor
of said state or other appropriate chief authority. If no action is taken
within sixty days, the Secretary can turn the information over to the
Attorney General with a recommendation that an appropriate civil action
be instituted, s 9 or that he exercise Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.190 The Secretary of HUD can terminate or reduce community
development block grant payments, or institute special administrative
procedures tailored to resolving disputes over compliance with the non-
discrimination requirements of the Act. 9'
Community groups concerned about redlining can monitor the use of
community development block grants, especially home loan guarantee
arrangements made with private lending institutions as private con-
tractors. The data maintenance requirements of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974192 mesh with data disclosure require-
ments of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975.193 If such
monitoring results in evidence of redlining, individuals or groups may
petition the Secretary of HUD to institute appropriate proceedings. If
the Secretary of HUD does not take action within a reasonable time,
then a civil suit is possible to force HUD to enforce the nondiscrimina-
tion requirements of the 1974 Act.' 94
VI. CONCLUSION
The redlining controversy will probably intensify during the next
year or two, spurred by the institutional data disclosure mandated by
187 Id. § 570.601(b)(4)(ii) (emphasis added).
188 Id. §570.601 (b) (3).
189 Id. § 570.912.
190 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1974).
191 24 C.F.R. § 570.913 (1975).
192 A block grant recipient must maintain general demographic data on race, ethnic
group, sex, age, and head of household within each census tract and maintain racial,
ethnic, and gender data showing the extent of participation and benefit from programs
funded under the Act. 24 C.F.R. § 570.905(f).
"I' See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra. The mesh will be greater if reporting
by census tract is required by regulations which the Federal Reserve Board will develop.
'91 The district court dismissed an attempt to order the Secretary of HUD to imple-
ment anti-discrimination sanctions for community development funds to New Castle,
New York. Evans v. Lynn, 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The appellate court in
an as yet unreported opinion stated, however, that the affirmative duty of the agency is to
assess the impact of grant allocations upon integration and to avoid the diversion of
funds which should be used to alleviate ghettoization. Evans v. Hills, No. 74-1793 (2d
Cir. June 4, 1976), aff'd sub nom. Although these community development funds were
for outdoor recreation under legislation predating the 1974 Housing and Community De-
velopment Act, the process stands as a model for groups that wish to promote the anti-
redlining impact of community development block grants.
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recently passed or pending legislation. Community action groups can
be expected to step up their efforts in three related areas: scrutiny of
FHA policies and practices, monitoring the allocations of community
development block grants, and general emphasis on "Neighborhoods
First" during the bicentennial year, all of which will have a stimulating
spillover on the anti-redlining movement. If Laujman is ultimately
decided against the lending institution, then a rash of cases fueled by
mandated data disclosure can be anticipated. Local governments will
be under increasing pressure to disqualify noncooperative institutions
as depositories of public funds.
Officers of lending institutions can use their resources and influence
to combat the pressures generated by the anti-redlining movement, but
the scenario would probably be a series of retreating skirmishes with
the spectre of credit allocation hovering in the background. Regulatory
agencies and public officials, though highly sympathetic to the legitimate
concerns of lending institutions, have exhibited increased sensitivity to
pressures from community groups and public interest organizations.
Those entrusted with the shaping of public policy must of necessity
seriously consider the challenge of saving urban housing. The redlining
controversy has placed private financial institutions in a crucial position
in this effort. The best strategy for lending institutions may well be to
voluntarily intensify affirmative action to pump home loans back into
savable urban neighborhoods.
DANIEL F. REIDY
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